Sunday, January 22, 2012

... [Hidden] Dragon (informally.)

Without respect to a single statistic, it is important to have the idea, if you are an informed person, that the development and proliferation of massively destructive arms is dangerous.  Dangerous not only as far as the intended use of the weaponry and its proliferation (again,) but to the makers of such arms and the danger of retaliation.  It is clear, in the nuclear arms developments in countries like Iran, the purpose of such things is primarily twofold:  a.  Such things serve to signify and determine the arrival and importance of nation - states like Iran on the international stage, and b.  As a retaliatory threat against any attack on any area of Iranian influence in the Middle East.

No one has doubted for a long time that Iran is an important country and that even in the time of its recent revolution, as a country, it influenced politics and ideas in many areas, especially Islamic ideas, that have provoked major and salient debates and discussions for a long time, both among national leaders and men in the street.  That Iran wishes, and this apparently, to assert its nuclear power and by that nuclear threat(s,) not only in the Middle East, but in prepondering fashion, as a bargaining chip to invite and extract tribute from other nations in its immediate vicinity and beyond does indeed lack some sense in what it might otherwise do to make friends and influence people.  Many people, and this due to what came out in the debates among the so - called great powers in the 1980's, do understand the visceral fear Eastern culture has about western ideas and society approaching and then invading its regions, among other things.  The argument of Iran in its tacit avoidance of speaking about this gives cause for suspicion about its motives in developing a massively destructive arms complex.  The same is true of other states who are developing nuclear weapons as well.

The visceral fear about societal and cultural influences invading and corrupting Islamic culture are indicative of pre - nuclear age nationalism as applied to the modern world and its present and potential security risks without respect to not only what is (the international status quo, to use old language,) but what might be.  A reasonable person, when examining things like the financial expense and energy, and other outputs necessary to the inputs of a nuclear arms complex, and the proportions of effort in a country such as Iran as used to develop such a complex and its capabilities resulting from deployment of such arms, probably will not agree that this state should have them.  This level of analysis comes from a strict examination of the scope of developing and deploying such arms, maintaining them and so forth; and this against NPT and other rules that are widely accepted by the great powers.  In fact, the strident call for such nuclear attributes in that country appear to be out - of - balance with any analysis of the allocation of its national assets, investments, income and / or capital.

Why is this so apparent?  While people like me do not read nor watch Arabic or Farci broadcasts, nor do we read publications in these languages, the thing is there is a common and known premise upon which Iran carries out its policies as evidenced by news reports, mostly trusted in free countries, that country is doing the bidding of others who are fed up with western ideas about society and specifically about government (bicameral legislature, separation of powers, rule of law (constitutional, civil, and others,) equality and rights, freedom of travel and expression, and the list goes on,) and the approach of the great powers to a little country called Israel.  This begs the question "How can an Islamist have any regard for Israel with its reform - minded and cosmopolitan people and ideas?"  This question, and its variants and derivatives is an old, nationalist - type question that invites direct slurs and epithets on the part of people who are not prejudiced among their own, but they are thereby highly nationalist and belligerent, and the smaller the better the country with fewer people, the easier the target for this mindset - and this has been true on the part of Middle East neighbors for years.  The implications of this question by association to Israel can be scaled upward to apply to more populous and important places, even entire regions whose applecarts are for the upset by Iranian nuclear, and other political ambitions.  With respect to this, and with respect to Iranian influences and politics now in evidence everywhere, the post - nationalist question might be proposed as "What can we do [together] to make a new approach to nuclear proliferation in view of these nationalist ideas?"

That this could be accomplished, just proposing a new approach to nuclear arms in the Middle East and elsewhere with some acknowledgement of the belligerence that goes along with some forms of nationalism, might itself be a way to invite a response to end the currents of what people like me know to be overt racism in the area as a tabled or distinctly different avenue of discussion apart from the current linkage racism and nationalism have there.  This, combined with a discussion about the visceral fears of being struck from outside, would serve to de - escalate at least some of the tensions that caused, for example, the 2006 war, continuing problems in Lebanon, and the useless formation of paramilitary brigades and other activities counter to peace in the area.

THS